CORRESPONDENCE

Market Forces and Union Decline:
A Response to Paul Weiler
Leo Troyt
In the Summer 1991 issue of The University of Chicago Law
Review, Professors Robert LaLonde and Bernard Meltzer squared
off against Professor Paul Weiler on how to explain the rapid
union decline since the 1950's. Professors LaLonde and Meltzer offered empirical data about the frequency and success of Section
8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) complaints under the NLRA. 1 Their data indicated that "some commentators [had] overestimate[d] the incidence and significance of employer lawlessness" as a factor to explain the decline in membership of American unions.2
By "some commentators," of course, they were referring in
particular to Professor Weiler, who has been the strongest proponent of what LaLonde and Meltzer called the "rogue employer thesis": that the decline of private sector unionization is attributable
to unlawful employer opposition.3 Professor Weiler responded to
LaLonde and Meltzer's empirical observations primarily by declar-

t Distinguished Professor of Economics, Rutgers University.

Robert J. LaLonde and Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look
at the Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U Chi L Rev 953 (1991). Section 8(a)(3) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA") forbids employers to fire employees for
unionizing activity. 29 USC § 158(a)(3) (1988). Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA requires employers to bargain in "good faith" with a union representing a majority of the employees. 29
USC § 158(a)(5) (1988).
2 LaLonde and Meltzer, 58 U Chi L Rev at 1006 (cited in note 1).
' Id at 954. For exposition of his "rogue employer thesis," see Paul Weiler, Promises to
Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 Harv L Rev
1769 (1983); Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law (Harvard, 1990).
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ing that, even granting "the validity of LaLonde and Meltzer's
numbers," he was still "perfectly prepared to rest [his] case for
major surgery on the NLRA."'4 Debate about the future of the
NLRA, he concluded, would be "more useful and more illuminating than this debate about whether 5 percent or 'just' 3 percent of
union voters are being fired by their employers during the representation contest." 5
So Professor Weiler invited readers of the controversy between him and Professors LaLonde and Meltzer to put aside the
statistical debate over Section 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) complaints and
reflect on "what difference this all makes" to explaining the decline of private unionism and bargaining (what I term the "Old
Unionism").6 My reaction is that it makes little difference in explaining what happened to the Old Unionism. Professor Weiler's
theory of employer opposition is at best marginal to the explanation of union decline. Instead, the explanation lies primarily in
natural market forces: structural changes in the American economy, increased domestic and foreign competition; and, yes, even
increased employee opposition to private unionization.

I.

THE INADEQUACY OF WEILER'S EMPLOYER OPPOSITION THEORY

Despite the sophisticated econometrics of Weiler's social science colleagues in Cambridge and elsewhere, employer opposition
to new organization could not possibly account for the huge losses
of membership and density for the Old Unionism. Private union
density is now less than one-third of its historic peak of 35.7 percent in 19531; it is even below its level of 12.0 percent in 1929. 9 As
these data show, unions' market penetration has steadily slipped
over the past forty years, forfeiting gains of earlier decades. And
there are no signs of reversal.

' Paul Weiler, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58 U Chi L
Rev 1015, 1025 (1991).
6 Id at 1032.
6 Id at 1025.
7 Id at 1028 ("The reason I was originally persuaded that the rise in employer unfair
labor practices had a real impact on the decline in union victories is that I had the good
fortune of being introduced to sophisticated work by my social science colleagues at Cambridge and elsewhere that demonstrated precisely that fact.").
' Leo Troy and Neil Sheflin, Union Sourcebook A-1 (Industrial Relations Data & Information Services, 1985). LaLonde and Meltzer similarly report in the first paragraph of their
article that "[f]rom 1953 to 1989, density fell from 35 percent to 12 percent, and the absolute number of union members in the private sector shrank from more than 14.8 million in
1953 to 10.5 million in 1989. 58 U Chi L Rev at 953-54 (cited in note 1).
I Troy and Sheflin, Union Sourcebook at A-1 (cited in note 8).
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Indeed, when we cross into the Twenty-First Century, I estimate that private union density will have fallen to its 1900 rate of
about seven percent. Organized labor in private markets will have
slipped backward by a century. Membership losses of that magnitude could not be made up by organizing the unorganized, even
absent rogue employers.
II.

STRUCTURAL CHANGE: THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA COMPARED

A.

Structural Change in the United States

The explanation for this virtual holocaust in the Old Unionism
is to be found in the marketplace, specifically in structural change
and more intense domestic and international competition. In the
1950s, the United States shifted from a goods-dominated to a private service-dominated economy. (Incidentally, this shift coincided
with the peak in union density in the 1950s.) Because the labor
market in private services is largely non-unionized, this structural
change naturally drove down the Old Unionism's market share. Indeed, even if the Old Unionism had not lost one member since
peaking at seventeen million members in 1970, its market share
today still would be only about eighteen percent-less than in 1937
and only about one-half of its all-time peak in 1953.10
Moreover, international competitive forces-accelerated by
the high exchange rate of the dollar from 1979 to 1985-have devastated the organized manufacturing industries-the core of the
Old Unionism. And the decline in the exchange rate of the dollar
after 1985 has brought no relief for the battered automobile, steel,
clothing, and other manufacturing industries. Instead, foreign output, whether originating from U.S.-owned establishments abroad
(outsourcing), or from foreign-owned companies, has continued to
provide significant competition for U.S.-located manufacturers,
and to reduce employment and union ranks, albeit it at a slower
pace.
At the same time, non-unionized manufacturers of high-tech
goods have survived these competitive conditions, and so have
steadily transformed the American industrial base. This transformation, another example of structural change, belies the claim that
the U.S. has suffered "de-industrialization" and so is in need of an

1oId.
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'industrial policy." The U.S. has not suffered de-industrialization,
but large-scale de-unionization of its industrial base.
In general, the decline in unions in many industries can be
attributed to such market forces as I have described. Deregulation
of the previously highly regulated transportation and communication industries has cost unions hundreds of thousands of members.
Structural change in the transportation industry-the shift from
rail to road to air-has cost railway unionism some 1.2 million
members since the end of World War II.11 And employer opposition in railways (where labor relations are subject to the Railway
Labor Act, a forerunner of the NLRA) is at most a faint memory
of the 1920s. Similar accounts could be told about how the market
has hurt construction and mining, two other industrial strongholds
of the Old Unionism.
The future only portends more of the same for American unions. Environmental regulation-which tends to stifle economic
growth-will only hurt such unionized industries as logging and
mining.2 All the while, international competition will only accelerate under the Free Trade Agreement with Canada and the prospective 'one with Mexico. In short, structural change in the American labor market has caused, and will continue to cause, the
decline in the Old Unionism.
B.

The Politically Correct Response: The Canadian Example

To those who reject or minimize structural change (LaLonde
and Meltzer regard it as only one factor),1 3 let me recall the unequivocal claims of Freeman and Medoff, on whose work Weiler and
others relied so extensively in rejecting structural change and em" Leo Troy, Will a More Interventionist NLRA Revive OrganizedLabor?, 13 Harv J L
& Pub Pol 583, 617, 619 (1990).
" A good example is the recent spotted owl controversy. Last year, a federal judge in
the state of Washington enjoined the U.S. Forest Service from selling timber on 66,000 acres
until it submitted a plan to protect the spotted owl that inhabited that land. In March, the
Forest Service submitted such a plan, estimating that it would cause a loss of 20,700 jobs in
the northwest states. The lumber unions have estimated losses closer to 40,000. See Charles
Abbott, Rare Owl in Battle for Land and Jobs in U.S., Reuter Library Rep (Mar 28, 1992);
New Polls Show Few Northwest Voters Willing to Sacrifice Jobs for Owls, Daily Rep Exec
(BNA) A9 (Mar 24, 1992); Forest Service Says Spotted Owl Plan Would Cost 20,700 Jobs
in West Coast States, Daily Lab Rep (BNA) A6 (Mar 9, 1992); Louise Kehoe, The Cost of
Saving the Spotted Owl, Fin Times 30 (Jan 15, 1992).
Also, Senator Dale Bumpers recently has sponsored a bill which would impose a 5%
royalty on minerals mined from public lands in the West. The mining industry estimates
that this bill would cause a loss of 30,000 jobs in the Western states. See Dirk Johnson,
Digging for Ore Still Pays; Should Miners Pay, Too?, NY Times Al (Feb 12, 1992).
" LaLonde and Meltzer, 58 U Chi L Rev at 957-58 (cited in note 1).
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bracing employer opposition 14
as the definitive explanation for the
decline of the Old Unionism.
After Freeman and Medoff found that structural change
"would have reduced the union density by ... 72 percent of the
observed decline" between 1954 and 1979,'" they nevertheless rejected their own results. (By the way, since the data they used included the public sector, they actually understated the effects of
structural change in the private sector.) Freeman and Medoff rejected their own findings because "[i]f structural changes were the
chief factor behind the decline in unionism, the proportion [of] organized [workers] would [have] fall[en] everywhere." 6 Union decline would have been universal, they claimed, because "[tihe major structural changes in the U.S. labor market ... have occurred
in virtually all major western economies.
Most telling, they continued, was Canada, "the country most like the United States."1 8
In Canada, "where many of the same unions and firms operate, the
percentage unionized went from below the U.S. percentage unionized to above it."'19 In light of this parallel structural change, Freeman and Medoff theorized, employer opposition in the U.S. had to
be the culprit.
This misinformation found its way into Weiler's (in)famous
Figure I of Promises to Keep2 ° to become the quantitative basis for
the divergence theory of Canadian-U.S. unionism, and for Weiler's
and others' demand for a more interventionist NLRA. But this was
not yet all. Freeman later repeated his rejection of structural
change on these same grounds:
If "post-industrial" or structural changes inexorably reduce
unionization, density would have fallen in Canada and other
developed countries, all of which have experienced essentially
the same structural changes as the United States, as well as in
2
the United States. '
To upset the structural argument, Freeman challenged doubters to
provide "[a] persuasive explanation of the decline in union density

See note 7.
Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 225 (Basic, 1984).
'e Id at 227.
17 Id at 226-27.
'8 Id at 227.
"

'5

19 Id.
20 Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1772 (cited in note 3).
21 Richard B. Freeman, Contraction and Expansion: The Divergence of Private and
Public Sector Unionism in the United States, 2 J Econ Persp 63, 70 (Spring 1988).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[59:681

in the United States," which, he wrote, "should also explain why
density did not decline in Canada in the same time period [from
1970 to 1985]. ''2 2
That view was echoed and re-echoed by academics across the
U.S., Canada, and Europe. The influence of these academic views
on the AFL-CIO is self-evident. The AFL-CIO found the
Canadian experience . . . instructive [because] Canada has
roughly the same type of economy, many similar employers,
and has undergone the same changes [as] the United States.
But in Canada ... the percentage of the civilian labor force
that is organized increased ... at the same time that the percentage of organized workers declined in the United States
23

C.

The Realities About the United States and Canada

But what are the realities about Canada? In point of fact, the
structural changes in the Canadian labor market have not been
"essentially the same," but "essentially different" from those in
the U.S. 24 And the structure of the Canadian economy remains
"essentially different" to this day.
To begin, Canada lagged the U.S. by more than a decade in
changing from a goods- to a services-based economy. 25 Thus one
should also expect Canada to have lagged in the decline of the density of its private unions. And it did, as I have shown elsewhere. 26
Moreover, Canada has developed a far larger public labor market-and, correspondingly, a much smaller private labor market-than the U.S., measured in relative terms. (In relative terms,
Canada's public labor market is more than double the size of the
American.) As a result, a larger fraction of Canada's employment
is virtually immune to market forces. This implies, of course, that

22

Id at 69.

2 AFL-CIO Committee on the Evolution of Work, The Changing Situation of Workers

and Their Unions 15 (Feb 1985).
24 Indeed, the same can be said of all other advanced industrial economies. For fuller
treatment of this argument, see Leo Troy, Is the U.S. Unique in the Decline of Private
Sector Unionism?, 11 J Labor Res 111 (Spring 1990); Troy, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol 583
(cited in note 11); and Leo Troy, Convergence in International Unionism, etc.: The Case of
Canada and the USA, 30 British J Indus Rel 1 (Mar 1992).
25 Id.
2 See generally Troy, 11 J Labor Res 111 (cited in note 24); Troy, 13 Harv J L & Pub
Pol 583 (cited in note 11); Troy, 30 British J Indus Rel 1 (cited in note 24).
27 Troy, 30 British J Indus Rel at 16 (cited in note 24).
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the unions for these public employees are also sheltered from competitive forces, in contrast to the Old Unionism.
At the same time, in relative terms, pro-union Canadian policy
has generated a much larger public sector union movement (the
"New Unionism") compared to the U.S. Indeed, Canadian policies
have transformed the Canadian union movement from one dominated by the Old Unionism to one dominated by the New Unionism. Currently, perhaps as much as two-thirds of the entire Canadian union membership is accounted for by the New Unionism. 28
In contrast, about sixty percent
of all U.S. union members still are
29
part of the Old Unionism.
Therefore, any comparison of the densities averaging the New
and the Old Unionism of two countries must yield misleading results. Such, in fact, is how the politically correct line made its comparison of the U.S. and Canada. If ever there was a statistical case
of comparing apples to oranges, the politically correct comparison
of Canadian and U.S. unionism is the exemplar.
When the New and Old Unionism are separately compared
across the two countries, I found that Canada's Old Unionism has
tracked the American, but with a lag. Canadian density peaked in
1958, five years after the U.S. peak, and membership topped out in
1979, nine years after the U.S.3 0 (A statistical breakdown of private
and public unionism is available for the U.S., but not for Canada,
which doubtless explains the basic fault of the politically correct
analysis. 1 ) Therefore, as for the impact of markets on the Old
Unionism (and the labor law)-well, I believe one can say "Q.E.D."
III.

EMPLOYEE OPPOSITION

But is there more to be said about the decline of unionism?
Why don't nonunion workers join? Yes, employers oppose the organization of their workers for fundamental economic and financial
reasons, 2 but I believe there is something else ignored by Weiler's
arguments: employee opposition.
Yes, it is possible that workers simply and rationally don't
wish to join. Oddly, in his references to polls, Weiler made no mention of the Harris poll (done for the AFL-CIO at the end of 1984),

',

Id at 7; Troy, 11 J Labor Res at 127 Table 4, 132 (cited in note 24).
Troy, 30 British J Indus Rel at 7 (cited in note 24).

30

Id.

2

" Troy and Sheflin, Union Sourcebook at A-1 to A-2 (cited in note 8).
31 See Barry T. Hirsch, Labor Unions and the Economic Performance of Firms 3, 12324 (Upjohn, 1991).
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which found that about two-thirds of nonunion workers said "no"
to representation when asked if they would vote for a union in a
secret ballot election.33 When Harris asked them why, fear of the
employer ranked near the bottom of nearly two dozen reasons." (A
Washington Post poll similarly found that three-fourths of the unorganized would not vote for a union in a secret ballot election;
sixty-two percent reported that they were not afraid of employer
retaliation.35 ) Ranked at the top of the reasons for rejecting unions, to the dismay of the Harris pollsters, was the perception that
unions and bargaining were irrelevant.36
Apparently these workers have become "free marketeers" in
this, the New Age of Adam Smith. Bad as this news had to be to
Weiler, et al, let's make a return visit to Canada, the epitome of so
much that they hold politically correct. The Canadian Federation
of Labour37 conducted a Harris-type poll in 1991 among unorganized workers and discovered, lo and behold, that about two-thirds
would not support a union. If that's the real Canada ....
CONCLUSION

To sum up, Weiler is correct that the statistical debate about
the extent of employer opposition is not that relevant to explaining
union decline. But he is correct for reasons that he would reject.
The explanation lies in the natural market forces that I have
briefly described: structural changes in the American economy,
which have occurred at different times than in Canada; increased
competition for the heavily unionized American manufacturing industries; and employee opposition to union organization.
Perhaps Weiler came to recognize the obstacle of employee opposition when he advocated legislatively-mandated works councils,
what he calls his "Constitutive Model": "[I]t is necessary," he said,
"to take away from the employees (and also the employer) the
choice about whether such a participatory mechanism will be pre3 Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., A Study on the Outlook for Trade Union Organizing 63 (submitted to The Labor Institute for Public Affairs and The Future of Work Committee, Nov 1984) (on file with U Chi L Rev) ("HarrisPoll").
3' Id at 65.
35 Peter Pen, The Lifeline for Unions: Recruiting, Wash Post H1 (Sep 13, 1987).
" Harris Poll at 2, 12, 15, 29 (cited in note 33).
37 A group of AFL building trade unions that seceded from the Canadian Congress of
Labour over jurisdictional matters.
38 Canadian Federation of Labour, Assessment of General Public and Membership Attitudes Toward Labour Unions, the CanadianFederationof Labour and Related Issues 3
(Jun 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
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sent."3 9 Unlike reforming the NLRA, which he recognized could be
treated as special interest legislation (the ghost of Roscoe Pound's
legal immunities), Weiler would compel representation, and representation with the right "of internal participation in a specified
range of decisions in all enterprises. 40° In one way or another,
workers-for their own good-must have some form of "industrial
representation," or "voice," even if it has to be forced on them.
State corporatism, not industrial democracy, is the new goal of the
neo-mercantilist, politically correct position in labor relations.
"
40

Weiler, Governing the Workplace at 282 (cited in note 3).
Id.

